New Publication! From Arming to Fighting? The Steps to War, Mutual Military Buildups and Dispute Onset in the Greece-Ottoman Empire/Turkey Rivalries

 My newest publication is co-authored article with Dr. Nioutsikos and Mrs. Daskalopoulou, part of our broader ARCADE project that was funded by the EU. This is a follow-up to our earlier article "Breaking the Stalemate in the Study of the Relationship of Mutual Military Buildups, Arms Races, and Militarized Disputes: The Greece-Turkey/Ottoman Empire Cases" published at All Azimuth in 2023. 

In "From Arming to Fighting? The Steps to War, Mutual Military Buildups and Dispute Onset in the Greece-Ottoman Empire/Turkey Rivalries" published at Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi - Journal of International Relations, we take the method for locating Mutual Military Buildups we developed in the All Azimuth article, and applied to inferential statistics. 

Here is the abstract

"Recent developments in the operationalization of mutual military buildups raise some questions about the findings of the quantitative literature on the association of mutual military buildups (MMB) and militarized dispute (MID) onset in the Greece-Ottoman Empire and Greece-Turkey dyads. We use the novel data to evaluate that relationship, working within the Steps to War explanatory framework. The Greece-Ottoman Empire and Greece-Turkey cases are puzzles for the framework, since on the one had they have a frequent presence of the Steps to War but have far fewer wars than we would expect. Our analysis indicates that despite that puzzling incongruity the Greece - Ottoman Empire and Greece-Turkey cases are good fits for the Steps to War, except when it comes to the role of mutual military buildups. We find indicators that while the other factors of Steps to War have a positive combined association with MID onset, the inclusion of mutual military buildups renders such an association statistically insignificant. On the other hand, we do find indicators that mutual military buildups may contribute to the transition from Lesser to Severe Rivalry, as per the Steps to Rivalry. Finally, the dyads reach infection periods that make war more likely as per the Steps to War. But many expected wars do not take place. We posit two possible explanations for future research: deterrence, or major power managerial coordination."

You may read the whole article at this link .

New Publication: Breaking the Stalemate in the Study of the Relationship of Mutual Military Buildups, Arms Races, and Militarized Disputes: The Greece-Turkey/Ottoman Empire Cases

 My most recent publication "Breaking the Stalemate in the Study of the Relationship of Mutual Military Buildups, Arms Races, and Militarized Disputes: The Greece-Turkey/Ottoman Empire Cases"   is now out with All Azimuth in online form. This is a co-authored piece with Ioannis Nioutsikos and Magdalini Daskalopoulou. It is part of the EU Funded ARCADE Porject.

You can get the gist of the argument from my narrated power point video in this post.

Essentially we argue for a new method for locating mutual military buildups in dyads, and use the Greece-Turkey/Ottoman Empire dyad as a model case. For replication data please consult the relevant page of this webpage. 

Narrated Lecture on Breaking the Stalemate in the study of the relationship of Mutual Military Buildups, Arms Races and Militarized Disputes: The Greece-Turkey/Ottoman Empire Cases

 I have prepared a video narration of my MPSA presentation on the paper "Breaking the Stalemate in the study of the relationship of Mutual Military Buildups, Arms Races and Militarized Disputes: The Greece-Turkey/Ottoman Empire Cases" which is under publication with All Azimuth . This co-authored paper is part of the larger ARCADE project supported by the Hellenic Foundation for Research and Innovation (H.F.R.I.) under the “2nd Call for H.F.R.I. Research Projects to support Post-Doctoral Researchers” (Project Number: 00789, ARCADE), a major grant project I am part of focusing on exploring the role of Mutual Military Buildups, Arms Races and there association with conflict onset in the Greece-Ottoman Empire/Turkey dyad 

New Publication: Caricaturing the enemy: caricatures and the Greek-Turkish War 1919-1922

Our publication, me, Ceren Mert-Travlos,and Doruk Akyuz,  "Caricaturing the enemy: caricatures and the Greek-Turkish War 1919-1922", is now published in the European Journal of Humour Research. In it we explore the manifestation of the enmity inherent in the concept of interstate rivalry via caricatures produced in Greece and Turkey during the 1919-1922 Greece-Turkey War

You may access the open access document at this link  (https://europeanjournalofhumour.org/ejhr/article/view/707) 

New Public Engangment: Συμμαχίες και άμεσο μέλλον της ελληνοτουρκικής διακρατικής αντιπαλότητας

 I have written another piece in Greek, presenting the findings of the Conflict Process tradition in the study conflict and peace on the relationship between alliances and war. 

See it at Huffington Post Συμμαχίες και άμεσο μέλλον της ελληνοτουρκικής διακρατικής αντιπαλότητας

Book Launch Event Recording

 We concluded the Book Launch event for "Salvation and Catastrophe: The Greek-Turkish War 1919-1922" organized by the Department of International Relations at Ozyegin University.

You can watch a recording of the event at YouTube

Book Laucnh "Salvation and Catastrophe : The Greek-Turkish War 1919-1922"

 You are cordially invited to our Book Launch for the my edited volume "Salvation and Catastrophe: The Greek-Turkish War 1919-1922", organized by the Department of International Relations at Özyeğin University.

 

 

You can register for the event via the following links

 

In English

https://events.ozyegin.edu.tr/en?myozu=1#/0/detail/13968/salvation-and-catastrophe-the-greek-turkish-war-1919-1922

 

In Turkish (event will be held in English)

https://events.ozyegin.edu.tr/tr#/0/detail/13967

 

Video Presentation for my edited volume: Salvation and Catastrophe: The Greek-Turkish War 1919-1922

 

Edited Volume "Salvation and Catasterophe: The Greek-Turkish War 1919-1922" is now out

 My edited volume "Salvation and Catastrophe: The Greek-Turkish War 1919-1922" is now out by Lexington Books. You can learn more on the website page dedicated to it. 

I also began a twitter thread discussing the book, which you can follow here.  A video presentation is in the works.

Publication: "From Universalism to Managerial Coordination: Major Power Regulation of the Use of Force"

 My newest publication “From Universalism to Managerial Coordination: Major Power Regulation of the Use of Force” has been published in Volume 17, Issue 2 of  the Asian International Studies Review.

This is an important point in my oldest research project, the study of interstate regulatory regimes in the international system. In my dissertation I began by exploring the consequences of what I termed major power managerial coordination. The idea from this study came from my exposure to the work of Paul Schroeder on the transformation of European politics, that of Peter Wallensteen on universalism and particularism , and the Steps to War theoretical framework.  

Publication: "Islands in a Sea of Fog"

 I have been lucky and Uluslararasi Iliskiler- International Relations has published in Volume 13, Issue 50, my article “Islands in a Sea of Fog: A Rapid Evidence Assessment of Quantitative Research in the pre-1816 Period”. You can find the abstract at

http://www.uidergisi.com.tr/?p=4140

A bit about the article

This article is part of my preparatory work for the next stage the 1715-1815 Militarized Interstate Dispute Project I am working on with others (see http://ktravlospolisci.blogspot.com.tr/p/research-ii.html and http://hdl.handle.net/2142/46760 ) . The goal was to conduct an overview of the field of quantitative studies that focus on temporal domains that include periods before 1815.  It was an exercise in locating existing datasets (of which there were many more than I initially thought there would be), becoming aware of synergies, looking at the types of articles that got published using pre-1815 data, and locating gaps. Suffice to say that there is a lot of data out there that can be linked to the 1715-1815 MID Project and provide enough variables to sustain quantitative analysis.  Beyond that some of the articles surveyed were very interesting on their own.

 During the review process it became evident that I would need something more than an overview, so I decided to also conduct a REA using data extracted from the articles, in order to ascertain how often they noted differences in behavior between the pre and post-1815 period. The findings in general did not support an expectation of difference. In another name studies that focus on the past were more likely to not find important differences with the present, making their findings relevant for the discussion of current issues. This finding of course challenges the “presentism” dominance in the study of conflict. That said I would caution that a more sophisticated meta-analysis might be required to resolve the question of relevance.

Publication! “Making a Case over Greco-Turkish Rivalry: Major Power Linkages and Rivalry Strength”

 (Ελληνική περίληψη μετά τον αγγλικό κείμενο)

My newest publication, co-authored with the indispensable Dr. Deniz S. Sert, “Making a Case over Greco-Turkish Rivalry: Major Power Linkages and Rivalry Strength”  is now online from the Ulusalrararsi Iliskiler-Journal ofInternational Relations and published in Volume 15, Issue 59.

In this project my co-author and me apply the concept of rivalry developed by Jame P.Klein, Paul F.Diehl, and Gary Goertz  to the evaluation of the weight of major power rivalries on the dynamics of the Greek-Ottoman and Greek-Turkish rivalries of the 19^th and 20^th century.

Publication Summary: Mobilization Follies in International Relations

 Mobilization Follies in International Relations by Konstantinos Travlos

Over the last academic year, I had two publications come out. Due to life events I was not able to sit down and write a short blog post summarizing them. Now I have a chance. Today I will talk for my contribution to a special issue by the All Azimuth journal. 

The goal of the issue was to provide a series of teaching tools in the form of articles for graduate student methodology and dissertation design courses. My contribution “Mobilization Follies in International Relations: A MultimethodExploration of Why Some Decision Makers Fail to Avoid War When PublicMobilization as a Bargaining Tool Fails”, sought to help students by presenting a full research article, but combining it with commentary on the decisions made throughout the process.

Publication Summary: Integrating Realist and Neoliberal Theories of War

 I finally found the time to write a summary of my most recent publication, with Dr. Daniel Geller. This is

Geller, D. S., & Travlos, K. (2019). Integrating Realist and Neoliberal Theories of War. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 25(2).

Abstract: The requirements for global security and international stability vary according to the perspective brought to bear on the subject. Indeed, the structural realist and neoliberal paradigms present markedly different views on the sources of war and prescriptions for peace. Structural realism focuses on system-level capability distributions, alliances, and dyadic power balances as factors associated with the onset of war. Neoliberalism emphasizes the importance of international institutions, democracy, and economic interdependence in maintaining global security. This study develops an integrated model of war and peace based on system-level factors drawn from both paradigms and utilizes a new database reflecting the level of major power policy coordination. The findings for the period of 1816–2007 indicate that interaction effects of these realist and neoliberal variables complement their relationships with global patterns of interstate conflict. The basic conclusion to be drawn is that both concentrated power and managerial cooperation at the apex of the international system are required to produce a more peaceful world.

This paper is the second paper published within my Interstate Managerial Coordination research program. In the first paper (Travlos, K. (2016). From Universalism to Managerial Coordination: Major Power Regulation of the Use of Force. Asian International Studies Review, 17(2), 27-53.) I laid forth the concept of managerial coordination and presented the methodology of for calculating the intensity of managerial coordination (IMaC), and applied to the major powers. In this paper me and Dr. Daniel Geller applied that information to evaluate a key question in international politics. This was the relative role of realist structural factors and liberal systemic factors on fostering interstate peace at the system level of analysis (See the work of  Dinna Zinnes on the difference between system and structure).

In the paper we pitched managerial coordination as an expression of the liberal paradigm in the study of international relations. I am not completely comfortable with that, but if by liberal we mean the idea that institutions count, then there is some sense to this. We thus reviewed the literature on structural conditions and systemic variables and their expected impact on interstate peace, and extracted a number of key “realist” structural conditions and key “liberal” systemic variables in order to evaluate whether “liberal” systemic variables ameliorate the conflict inducing influence of “realist” structural conditions.

New Publication: “By Consent and Management”: Aversion to war, innovative thinking and managerial coordination at Utrecht 1713 and Vienna 1815

 My newest publication is now out at the Journal of Diplomatic Research . Here is a summary for “By Consent and Management: Aversion to war, innovative thinking and managerial coordination at Utrecht 1713 and Vienna 1815".

The existing literature on international order, and the establishment of norms and regimes that dampen the drive to war inherent in an anarchical and power-politics dominated international political system, has long argued for a connection between war and engagement by decision makers in practices with which they aim to decrease the likelihood of a new war erupting. One such practice is managerial coordination. The existing literature argues that decision makers are more likely to engage in managerial coordination if they come to fear war as a tool of politics, due to seeing it as a threat on their hold on power. This is called aversion to war. This can be caused by war-weariness, which is increasing societal opposition to the war and the decision makers pursuing it, due to the financial, psychological, and physical costs of war. It can also be caused by fear of the radical potential of war, which is the corrective effect societal effort for certain types of war to lead hitherto marginalized groups to challenge the domestic power structure.

Participation in wars that are likely to generate aversion to war, will lead decision makers to question the power-politics culture that leads them to take actions that make war more likely. However, absent the conceptualization of alternatives to the power-politics practices that permeate international politics, decision makers will be unable to conceive of ways to break out from extant practices. This is where innovative thinking becomes important. By this term, building on the work of Paul Schroeder and Jennifer Mitzen, I mean the ability of decision makers to conceptualize existing practices of international politics as problematic and unable to avert the onset of dangerous wars, and promote alternatives.

The combination of aversion to war and innovative thinking is noted by Paul Schroeder as explaining the decision of the major powers to engage in the Vienna Congress system after the Napoleonic Wars. Here I compare the attitudes of the decision makers at the Congress of Vienna with those that negotiated the Treaty of Utrecht. My goal is to discover if the main difference between the two cases, is associated with attitudes of aversion to war and innovative thinking among decision makers.

The case of Utrecht is a good comparison for Vienna because of the similarity and differences. Both come as a result of complex major power wars, of similar duration, and characterized by large causalities compared to previous wars. But whereas the Congress of Vienna is followed by a long period of peace among its participants, the Treaty of Utrecht fails to pacify European international relations. It is this incongruity that makes Utrecht a useful counter-case to Vienna.  For my comparison, I marshal the secondary literature by historians, scholars of international relations, as well as published primary sources.

For the Congress of Vienna, I focus on tracking the attitudes of Lord Castlereagh (United Kingdom), the Liverpool Cabinet (United Kingdom), Prince Metternich (Austria), Prince Talleyrand (France), Prince Hardenberg and his assistant Humboldt (Prussia), King Frederick William III (Prussia), and Czar Alexander I (Russia). For Utrecht I focus on tracking the attitudes of Viscount St. John Bolingbroke (United Kingdom), Queen Anne (United Kingdom), King George I (United Kingdom), Harley Lord Oxford (United Kingdom), the Parliamentary Whigs (United Kingdom), the Parliamentary Tories (Untied Kingdom), King Louis XIV (France) and Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis of Torcy (France).

Figure was not used in the manuscript in the end.

The descriptive analysis of the two case studies, led to the discovery of several facts. First, in both cases decision makers exhibited aversion to war. In Utrecht the decision makers of the United Kingdom gave indicators of worry both about war weariness, and fear of the radical potential of the war. They saw a continuation of the war as likely to foster conditions that would permit the exiled Stuart dynasty to challenge the German succession to the British thrones. French decision makers on the other hand only exhibited war weariness. Importantly none of the decision makers exhibited any innovative thinking. They saw what they were doing in Utrecht as well within the existing power-politics structure. Finally, almost all of the decision makers were out of power within several years after 1715. In Vienna the decision makers exhibited more indicators of fear of the radical political potential of war compared to those at Utrecht. Four of the decision makers exhibited indicators of innovative thinking compared to none at Utrecht. More importantly, the duration of political relevance among the decision makers in Vienna was much longer than those of Utrecht.

Another key difference that was discovered was in the way the two negotiations were pursued. In Utrecht, two major powers forged a peace between their number and then coerced the other powers involved in the war to adhere to it. In Vienna on the other hand all the European major powers participated in the negotiations. This difference may be an additional reason that explains the lack of peace among the major powers after Utrecht, compared to after Vienna.

Based on the above descriptive comparative analysis I extracted a number of explanatory propositions that can be the basis for hypotheses to be evaluated according to the logic of confirmation. These are that increased engagement in managerial coordination is more likely to follow multilateral efforts at peace-making after complex wars among a group of states. That decision makers engaged in negotiations are more likely to foster increased post-war practice of managerial coordination when war-participation has generated among them a fear of the radical potential of war, compared to if only it generated war-weariness. That increased managerial coordination is more likely to follow war-termination negotiations were decision makers exhibit innovative thinking about international relations. That increased managerial coordination is more likely to follow war-termination negotiations if the decision makers that advocated for its practice remain in power in the post-war period.