I finally found the time to write a summary of my most recent publication, with Dr. Daniel Geller. This is
Geller, D. S., & Travlos, K. (2019). Integrating Realist and Neoliberal Theories of War. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 25(2).
Abstract: The requirements for global security and international stability vary according to the perspective brought to bear on the subject. Indeed, the structural realist and neoliberal paradigms present markedly different views on the sources of war and prescriptions for peace. Structural realism focuses on system-level capability distributions, alliances, and dyadic power balances as factors associated with the onset of war. Neoliberalism emphasizes the importance of international institutions, democracy, and economic interdependence in maintaining global security. This study develops an integrated model of war and peace based on system-level factors drawn from both paradigms and utilizes a new database reflecting the level of major power policy coordination. The findings for the period of 1816–2007 indicate that interaction effects of these realist and neoliberal variables complement their relationships with global patterns of interstate conflict. The basic conclusion to be drawn is that both concentrated power and managerial cooperation at the apex of the international system are required to produce a more peaceful world.
This paper is the second paper published within my Interstate Managerial Coordination research program. In the first paper (Travlos, K. (2016). From Universalism to Managerial Coordination: Major Power Regulation of the Use of Force. Asian International Studies Review, 17(2), 27-53.) I laid forth the concept of managerial coordination and presented the methodology of for calculating the intensity of managerial coordination (IMaC), and applied to the major powers. In this paper me and Dr. Daniel Geller applied that information to evaluate a key question in international politics. This was the relative role of realist structural factors and liberal systemic factors on fostering interstate peace at the system level of analysis (See the work of Dinna Zinnes on the difference between system and structure).
In the paper we pitched managerial coordination as an expression of the liberal paradigm in the study of international relations. I am not completely comfortable with that, but if by liberal we mean the idea that institutions count, then there is some sense to this. We thus reviewed the literature on structural conditions and systemic variables and their expected impact on interstate peace, and extracted a number of key “realist” structural conditions and key “liberal” systemic variables in order to evaluate whether “liberal” systemic variables ameliorate the conflict inducing influence of “realist” structural conditions.
The realist “structural” conditions we used were capability concentration (Ray and Singer 1973), polarity (Morgenthau [1948] 1967, Waltz 1979, and Midlarsky 1988) and hierarchy (Organski 1958, Organski and Kugler 1980, Gilpin 1981, Modelski 1983, Wallerstein 1984, Geller and Singer 1998, Wohlforth 1999, Tammen et al. 2000, Kugler 2006, Rasler and Thompson 2015, and Allison 2017). My own concept of Managerial Coordination was the main “liberal” systemic variable. We evaluated both the distinct influence of each variable, and of their interactions.
Distribution of variables 1816-2007
We conducted a statistical analysis using system year observations for the 1816-2007 period. Our dependent variables were the frequency (sum of all interstate wars beginning in a system year), severity (sum of all battle-deaths of all interstate wars that ended in a system year) , duration (sum of duration of all interstate wars that ended in a system year) and magnitude (sum of all nation-months of participation of participants in all interstate wars that end in a system year) of all interstate wars in a system year. We had 192 obsevations, enough to sustain regression analysis. The characteristics of the data led us to mainly use zero-inflated negative binomial regressions, with some cases evaluated by Poisson regression. For robustness we used OLS with the logged versions of the dependent variables or ordinary Negative Binomial regression.
Our findings can be summarized as following. Polarity has a positive association with the frequency of wars, but none with their characteristics. Hierarchy has negative association with the frequency of wars, but no association with their characteristics. Capability concentration has a negative association with duration, but no association with frequency and the other characteristics of war. Major Power managerial coordination has negative association with both frequency and the severity of wars, but no association with the other characteristics.
When we combine all variables in the same models, polarity dampens severity, hierarchy fosters severity and magnitude, capability concentration dampens frequency, severity and magnitude, while managerial coordination dampens frequency, severity and magnitude. What is indicative here is that polarity is less relevant than inequality variables when seeking some of the elements that are conducive to the avoidance of interstate war.
When we interact the variables we find indicators that managerial coordination dampens the war fostering effects of declining hierarchy, increasing polarity, decreasing capability concentration. In another name increasing major power managerial coordination can mitigate the negative effects from the undermining of the structural conditions that underpin hierarchical orders.
Thus our final findings indicate that a core element fostering interstate peace (and we are only focusing in interstate pace) on the systemic level is a combination of asymmetrical capability distributions and managerial coordination among systems members.
This finding lead me to make the following two suppositions about the current debate on the decline of the “Liberal” hegemonic order.
1) Robust managerial coordination among the major powers, and perhaps around regional durable security complexes can mitigate the negative effects of the retreat of US world power.
2) Any power transition that is associated with reinvigorated commitment to managerial coordination is more likely to cause less warfare than any power transition that is associated by a collapse of managerial coordination.
3) Institutions (“rules” based orders”) matter but only in conjunction with the presence of strong actors willing to uphold them.
