(Ελληνική περίληψη μετά τον αγγλικό κείμενο)
My newest publication, co-authored with the indispensable Dr. Deniz S. Sert, “Making a Case over Greco-Turkish Rivalry: Major Power Linkages and Rivalry Strength” is now online from the Ulusalrararsi Iliskiler-Journal ofInternational Relations and published in Volume 15, Issue 59.
In this project my co-author and me apply the concept of rivalry developed by Jame P.Klein, Paul F.Diehl, and Gary Goertz to the evaluation of the weight of major power rivalries on the dynamics of the Greek-Ottoman and Greek-Turkish rivalries of the 19th and 20th century.
We wanted to interrogate the popular view, both in Turkey and in Greece, that the rivalry between the two states is primarily driven by the major powers for their own goals. We decided to focus on one of the many forms of behavior that this dynamic could lead to in international relations. Specifically we evaluated whether variations in the intensity of major power rivalries influenced variation in the intensity of the Greek-Ottoman and later, Greek-Turkish rivalry. To gauge this hypothesized relationship we used the Basic Rivalry Level (BRL) developed by Paul F.Diehl and Gary Goertz. We posit that changes in the BRL (volatility) of major power rivalries will affect changes in the BRL of Greek-Ottoman and Greek-Turkish rivalries.
However, this relationship, and direction of volatility, is mediated by the type of links between the major power rivalries and the Greek-Ottoman and Greek-Turkish rivalries. We posit two types of linkage. Oppositional Linkage, in which each one of the rivals in the major power rivalry is connected (via alliances or alignment-the concept as developed by Gennady Rudkevich who also was kind to make his data available to us) to each one of the sides in the Greek-Ottoman or Greek-Turkish rivals, with no cross-linkages. The example here is the Ottoman Empire allied with Germany in World War I, versus Greece allied with the United Kingdom. We posit such linkages to foster the transmission of major power enmity to the minor power rivalry. In another name, when the major rivalry intensifies, so does the minor rivalry, as the major power rivals export their enmity to their minor power clients and proxies.
The other type of linkage we term Regulatory Linkage. In this case either one of the two major power rivals is connected (again via alignment or alliance) with both states in the minor power rivalry, or there are cross-linkages between the two pairs. The example here is the US alliance with Turkey and Greece. We posit such linkages to have a dampening effect on the volatility of the minor power rivalry.
Our hypothesis then focused on the supposition that
a) domestic and intra-rivalry factors, in another name conditions specific to Greece and Turkey/Ottoman Empire, will have more explanatory influence than the volatility of linked major power rivalries. In another name, the popular view is not supported.
b) on the idea that the restrictive effect on conflict of regulatory linkages means that volatility in the minor power rivalry will mean that increases in the volatility of the Greek-Turkish/Ottoman Empire rivalry should follow periods in which the regulatory powers are distracted/occupied with their own rivalries. Put differently, the minor powers are free to pursue escalatory policies in their relationship when the major powers patrons are busy with their own conflicts. In popular terms, when the cat is out, the mice dance. For example the Cyprus War took place during a period of intensification of the US-Soviet rivalry, which created space for adventurism by both the Greek government (the Samson coup) and the Turkish government ( initiating the war with the Republic of Cyprus).
c) on the idea that Oppositional Linkage can see volatility travel both ways, as increased conflict between the major power patrons of the two minor power rivals may lead to their own rivalry intensifying, but intensification in their own conflicts can lead to their major power patrons intervening which can lead to increased conflict among them. For example the increasing UK-German competition in 1910-1914, affecting the intensification of Greek-Ottoman relations.
Using the above concepts in conjunction with observational historical data, we divide the Greek-Turkish and Greek-Ottoman rivalries into three periods. From 1866-1914 we located indicators of a weak Regulatory Linkage between the naval powers (UK and France) and Greece-Ottoman Empire. In 1958-2001 we located indicators of strong Regulatory Linkage between the US and it’s two NATO allies. In 1914-1918 we located the indicators of the main period of Oppositional Linkage, as the alliances of the First World War engulfed the Greek-Ottoman relationship. For the two periods of Regulatory Linkage we conducted a large-n study evaluation, while for the 1914-1918 period we reverted to a qualitative exploration due to the few observations.
In general our findings support the view, which had supportive indicators from previous studies of the Greek-Turkish rivalries, that the main driving force of the Greek-Ottoman and Greek-Turkish rivalries is endogenous to the rivals. In another name conditions specific to Greece, Turkey and the Greek-Turkish relationship are mainly responsible for explaining the variation in enmity among the two states (and on the past Greece and the Ottoman Empire). We did not find statistically significant indicators (i.e that could not be the result of random chance) that the volatility of major power rivalries influence, or was influenced by, the volatility of the Greek-Turkish and Greek-Ottoman interstate rivalries. This does not mean that major power politics do not play their role, but that role is mediated by domestic and dyadic conditions.
At the very least the popular view that the Greek-Turkish rivalry, and in the past the Greek-Ottoman rivalry, one recently rekindled by popular Turkish TV series like Vatamin Sensin and Payithat Abdulhamid, are driven primarily by “nefarious” third parties for their own use, needs reconsideration. Major Powers may play their role in Greek-Turkish enmity. But it is doubtful if they see that enmity as useful or central to their own competitions when those reach their highest intensity. A useful rivalry that is irrelevant to the major powers when engaged in life and death struggles, does raise the question of what exactly does it get them (beyond sectoral gains for military industries, which previous studies on Greek-Turkish arm races have questioned).
You can find the replication files and the online appendix at https://ktravlospolisci.blogspot.com/p/replication-data.html
If you want access to the paper please email me at my academic email.
Previous posts by me relevant to Greek-Turkish Relations
You can find the replication files and the online appendix at https://ktravlospolisci.blogspot.com/p/replication-data.html
If you want access to the paper please email me at my academic email.
Previous posts by me relevant to Greek-Turkish Relations
Salvation and Catastrophe: The Greek-Turkish War 1919-1923, a monthly series covering the history of that conflict by me.
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Η πιο πρόσφατη δημοσίευση μου, σε συνεργασία με την Δρ. Ντενιζ Σ. Σερτ έχει τώρα λήμμα στην σελίδα της δίγλωσσης επιστημονικής επιθεώρησης Ulusalrararsi Iliskiler-Journal of International Relations. Με τίτλο “Making a Case over Greco-Turkish Rivalry: Major Power Linkages and Rivalry Strength” η έντυπη δημοσίευση είναι στον 15ο τόμο, 59ο τεύχος, της επιστημονικής επιθεώρησης.
Στο άρθρο αυτό, η συνεργάτις μου και εγώ πραγματευόμαστε την κοινότυπη πίστη σε Ελλάδα και Τουρκιά, ότι η διακρατική αντιπαλότητα των δυο κρατών, και πιο παλιά μεταξύ Ελλάδος και Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας, κυρίως δημιουργείται και διατηρείται από της Μεγάλες Δυνάμεις για ιδιοτελής λογούς. Συγκεκριμένα εξετάζουμε μια εμπειρική έκφανση του πιθανού γενικού φαινόμενο, για να δούμε την ορθότητα της κοινότυπης πίστης. Κάνουμε την εξέταση χρησιμοποιώντας την έννοια της διακρατικής αντιπαλότητας των Κλεϊν, Ντιεχλ, και Γκοερτζ, και την ποσοτικοποίηση της έντασης της αντιπαλότητας μεσώ της μεταβλητής Βασικό Επίπεδο Αντιπαλότητας (Basic Rivalry Level (BRL)) των Ντιεχλ και Γκοερτζ.
Με αυτά τα εργαλεία υποθέτουμε, ότι αν πράγματι η ελληνοτουρκικές αντιπαλότητες είναι αποτέλεσμα της πολίτικης των μεγάλων δυνάμεων, τότε οι διακυμάνσεις στην ένταση της ελληνοτουρκικής και ελληνο-οθωμανικης αντιπαλότητας, καταγεγραμμένες μεσώ BRL, θα επηρεάζονται από διακυμάνσεις στην ένταση των αντιπαλοτήτων των μεγάλων δυνάμεων. Σαν κεντρικές ενδιάμεσες μεταβλητές έχουμε τον τύπο σύνδεσης μεταξύ των αντιπαλοτήτων των «μικρών» κρατών και των αντιπαλοτήτων των Μεγάλων Δυνάμεων. Διακρίνουμε δυο τύπους σύνδεσης, την αντιθετική σύνδεση (Oppositional Linkage ) και την ελεγκτική σύνδεση (Regulatory Linkage) . Στην πρώτη περίπτωση οι αντίπαλες μεγάλες δυνάμεις έχουν διαφορετικές και αποκλειστικές επαφές (μεσώ συμμαχιών ή ευθυγράμμισης θέσεων) με τα αντίπαλα μικρά κράτη. Στην δεύτερη περίπτωση, ένας ή και οι δυο αντίπαλοι έχουν διασταυρωμένες σχέσεις με μια ή και της δυο αντίπαλες μεγάλες δυνάμεις. Σαν εναλλακτική εξήγηση πριμοδοτούμε τα πρωτεία της εσωτερικής πολίτικης και δυαδικών συνθηκών εντός τον ελληνοτουρκικών σχέσεων.
Τα αποτελέσματα της ερευνάς μας δεν βρήκαν υποστήριξη στην ιδέα της διασύνδεσης μεταξύ της αντιπαλότητας των μεγάλων δυνάμεων και της ελληνοτουρκικής και ελληνο-οθωμανικης αντιπαλότητας. Αντίθετα κύριο επιρροή έχουν παράγοντες εσωτερική της δυαδικής σχέσης. Αυτό δεν σημαίνει ότι οι μεγάλες δυνάμεις δεν επηρεάζουν την ελληνοτουρκική αντιπαλότητα, αλλά αυτή η επιρροή πιθανόν δεν φαίνεται να είναι συνδεδεμένη με της πιο ακραίες μορφές ανταγωνισμού τους.
