I was able to read a short (173 pages) book published in
Greek, in Greece, focusing on clarifying the activities of Greek High Commissioner
in Asia Minor, Aristeidis Stergiadis, during the collapse of the Greek Army of
Asia Minor after the Turkish Grand Offensive in August 1922. It is written by
Konstantinos D. Vlassis. Vlassis is a not an academic historian (he holds an MA
in Modern and Contemporary History) but has made a name of himself as a popular
historian focusing on the activity of Post-November 1920 anti-venizelists governments,
especially during the period right before and during the collapse of the Greek
position in Asia Minor/Anatolia in 1922. He has an anti-venizelist bent in his
works, and aims to combat what he considers a Venizelist bias in the historiography
of the war in Greece, especially among scholars and people descended from Asia
Minor refugees and expellees. What makes him unique is his focus on the use of
primary sources (in this way he reminds me of the non-academic historical scholar
of the US Civil War, William Marvel). While one can disagree with the conclusions
he extracts from those primary sources, one cannot deny that he does bring to
light and uses some very interesting primary sources.
In this book he aims basically to counter both Venizelist interpretations
of the events of 1922, as well as post-event rationalizations by Stergiadis
himself, concerning the role the High Commission played during the period
between the collapse of the Greek front, and the evacuation of the Greek government
administration from Smyrna/ Izmir. On that front his most important findings
are that a) Stergiadis became aware of the collapse of the front much more
earlier than the Greek government, and the Commander in Chief of the Army of Asia
Minor Georgios Chatzanestis, asking early on both the Greek government and the
consuls of the Major Powers to arrange for the protection of the Smyrna Zone by
an international force (this was rejected by the consuls) b) that Stergiadis had
given an order on 19th August (O.C) to prepare the evacuation of the
Greek administrative apparatus without informing the local population of that
decision, that on 21/22 August (O.C) he had asked the government to prohibit
the exit of the population from Asia Minor to Greece citing the lack of
shipping which was focused on evacuating as much of the army as possible for
use in Thrace, and that quite quickly these restrictions (between the 22 or 23rd
of August) were lifted, which resulted in potentially about 200,000 Greeks,
Armenians, Circassians and other anti-Kemalist Muslims evacuating to Greece
before the entry of Turkish forces into Smyrna/Izmir.
Stergiadis next to Liutenant General Leonidas Paraskevopoulos (Commander in Chief of the General HQ of the Greek army 1918-1920)
For those of us interested in the military history of the
war, the booklet contains some interesting information. First, the focus on
evacuating as much of the army as possible had a strategic goal, which was to
reinforce the Greek forces in Eastern Thrace. More importantly the primary
sources presented by Vlassis (telegrams sent by the High Commission in the
period between the breaking of the military front and the final evacuation of
the administrative apparatus) finally provide the details of the removal of Chatzanestis
from command of the Army of Asia Minor. The decision was not initiated in
Athens , or by the High Commissioner. Instead it was forced upon both by the
staff of the general HQ in Smyrna/Izmir where opposition to Chatzanestis was
reaching the level of a potential mutiny.
On 16th August (O.C) the Government in Athens decided to send Minister of Interior Nikolaos Stratos, and Minister of Military Affairs Nikolaos Theotokis to Smyrna/Izmir in reaction to a 15th August (O.C) telegram from Chatzanestis announcing the retreat of the Greek Army to a Easter of Philadelphia-East of Bursa line. The same day Stergiadis had sent Major Theodoros Skylakakis (of the HQ staff) to the front. Skylakakis returned on the 17th, and informed Stergiadis of the collapse of the front, and his bleak report became the basis of Stergiadis view of the situation on the front. The two then informed the two ministers (who arrived in Smyrna/Izmir on the 17th and left for Athens on the 18th). It was at this point that the Government in Athens became fully aware of the size of the disaster that had taken place, while Stergiadis requested the dispatch of shipping to evacuate the army and the administration. Skylakakis, who served in the III Office of the HQ, was also the person who informed the High Commissioner of the collapse of trust to Chatzanestis among staff officers. But Stergiadis considered it unlikely that the government would at that point replace Chatzanestis.
Probably on 21 August
(O.C) the staff officers took action sending an anonymous telegram to the Government,
signed by the Staff of the Army of Asia Minor, which demanded the replacement
of Chatzanestis and the restoration of Major General Konstnatinos Pallis and Colonel
Ptolemaios Sarrigianes to the position of Chief and Deputy Chief of Staff the
Army of Asia Minor (who had served in those position during the tenure of Lieutenant
General Anastatios Papuasa, predecessor of Chatzanestis), in order to replace
Major General Georgios Valletas and
Colonel Mihail Passares who were the incumbents, and declared incompetent. This
is of course a clear example of a staff mutiny.
Alarmed the government requested the view of Stergiadis. On the
night of 21 August (O.C) Stergiadis replied in telegram, where while he refused
to confirm that the staff officers had sent the telegram, or if the views expressed
in it were representative he believed replacing Chatzanestis was a necessity.
He went as far as to cite rumors of conspiracy brewing against Chatzanestis
which carried even the threat of physical action against the commander in
chief. The government made its decision on the night of 22 August (O.C) in a
session that ended at 0200 hours. Chatzanestis was replaced by Major General Nikolaos
Trikoupis (which unknown to the government had been captured by Turkish forces),
the Army Staff Service was given to Lieutenant General Viktor Dusmanes (a
position with little authority on the Army of Asia Minor, but indicative of the
crisis in the government as until then Gounares had opposed any influence on
military affairs by Dusmanes) , while Lieutenant General Georgios Polymenakos
who had resigned command of C Corps when Chatzanestes became commander in
chief, was also reactivated and sent to Asia Minor. Finally Palles and Sarrigiannis
were also dispatched to Asia Minor to take over the staff.
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What becomes clear is the level of collapse in the hierarchy
of the Army of Asia Minor during the collapse of the front. Essentially Chatzanestis
was removed after a de-factor mutiny in the HQ staff. While it is not indicated
in the sources that Polymenakos was dispatched with the intention that he take
over (he did become Commander in Chief once it became clear Trikoupis was
captured), it would be the height of folly to expect a Lieutenant General to
serve under a Major General. Probably Trikoupis was seen as a temporary
commander, until Polymenakos could take control.
I am providing a translation of the key telegram sent by
Stergiadis on 21 August on this issue, which is reproduced in the book’s
appendix (with many of the other primary sources used).
GES/DIS F.400/E4 (Army General Staff/ Directorate of History
File 400/E4- depository of the primary document)
“21 August 1922- Time 23.20’, MMA (Ministry of Military
Affairs)-Office of the Minister from Smyrna towards the President of the Government,
Thrice Urgent-To be given immediately on receipt-Personal-Highly Confidential,
protocol number E.P.2874. (Receipt 22 August 1922- Time 03:00)
In answer to your telegram number 12236 I have the honor
to inform of the following. I am not in the position to certify if the position
of the whole Army towards the Commander in Chief is exactly as presented in the
mentioned telegram. Neither whether all of the officers of the Staff, without
exception, agreed to the dispatch of said telegram. However, on the basis of my
own immediate experience kai credible information , quite reliable in my view, primarily
from confidential conversations between me and senior officers in Smyrna, the
majority of which belong to the HQ Staff, I can say that with the negative turn
of military events, a large number oof officers of all ranks are in revolt
against the Commander in Chief and they do not hide their disgust considering
him as the main person responsible for the disaster. They are especially
offensive towards his person for the following.
First, that independently of his responsibility for
affairs before the onset of the conflict he did not quickly and on time
understand the magnitude and rapidity of the disaster. Second, that he
exhibited lack of decision after the collapse and as a result crucial time was
lost. Third, that he did not understand what was needed to be done during the
first phase of the disaster and does not seem even at this time able to implement
decisive and resolute action according to a clear plan. Fourth, that any cooperation
with him by even the best officers is rendered impossible by his character,
which people who had to cooperate with him consider obnoxious. Fifth, that
older petty disputes and biases held against him have become now magnified and intensified
by the disaster, which has led older opinions on him to be added to the ones created
by the current vertigo situation and result in the majority of officers having
lost all confidence in his person.
You know from a previous telegram of mine my own view
that the causes and extent of this disaster do not provide any hope of salvation.
That said, I cannot keep to myself the following thoughts. When nay Army has
been subjected to such a disaster, the changing of the Commanders, even when
they bear no responsibility for the disaster, is mandated by the need to
placate and embolden the soldiers and officers, specially with the goal of averting
incidents of indiscipline , which can unfortunately even engender a mutiny.
I fear for the last because I have serious reasons to
believe that there is already at foot, if not a organized conspiracy, a situation
such that emotions are so high due to the National danger, that when more
troops come in from the front, there may erupt an indiscipline mutiny that
could even reach the level of physical assault or expulsion of the Commander in
Chief.
I do not think I need to explain what will follow if to
all our other unlucky events this is also added. With the above all that I can
indicate is that any decision by you must be made and announced with no delay.
STERGIADIS”
Citation
Konstantinos D. Vlassis (2022) Oi televtaies ihmeres tou
Armoste: O Aristeidis Stergiadis kai o Avgustos tu 1922 (The Last Days of the
High Commissioner: Aristeidis Stergiadis and the August of 1922). Athens, Oxi (Brainfood Ekdotiki), pages 142-143
Appendix 5A
